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ABSTRACT What is the relation between perceptual experience and the suite
of sensorimotor skills that enable us to act in the very world we perceive? The
relation, according to ‘sensorimotor models’ (O’Regan and Noë 2001, Noë
2004) is tight indeed. Perceptual experience, on these accounts, is enacted via
skilled sensorimotor activity, and gains its content and character courtesy of
our knowledge of the relations between (typically) movement and sensory
stimulation. I shall argue that this formulation is too extreme, and that it
fails to accommodate the substantial firewalls, dis-integrations, and special-
purpose streamings that form the massed strata of human cognition. In
particular, such strong sensorimotor models threaten to obscure the
computationally potent insensitivity of key information-processing events to
the full subtleties of embodied cycles of sensing and moving.
I
T hePainter and the Perceiver. Seeing, according to Noë 2004,is like painting. Painting is an ongoing process in which the
eye probes the scene, then flicks back to the canvas, then back to
the scene, and so on, in a dense cycle of active exploration and
partial, iterated cognitive uptake. It is this cycle of situated,
world-engaging activity that constitutes the act of painting.
Seeing (and more generally, perceiving) is likewise constituted
(Noë claims) by a process of active exploration in which the
sense organs repeatedly probe the world, delivering partial and
restricted information on a need-to-know basis. It is this cycle,
of situated, world-engaging, whole animal activity, that is the
locus, on Noë’s account, of genuine cognitive interest, at least
for perceptual experience.
An important implication of this, according to Noë, is that
appeals to internal representations (if such there be) cannot tell
the whole story, either for painting or for seeing:
The causally sufficient substrate of the production of the picture is
surely not the internal states of the painter, but rather the dynamic
pattern of engagement among the painter, the scene and the
canvass. Why not say the same thing about seeing? Seeing, on
this approach, would depend on brain, body and world. (Noë
2004, p. 223)
In the case of seeing (and perceiving in general) a theoretical
construct peculiarly well-suited to this dynamic target is the
notion of sensorimotor dependencies (aka sensorimotor
contingencies—see O’Regan and Noë 2001). Sensorimotor
dependencies are relations between movement or change and
sensory stimulation. Such relations may be of many kinds (see
below) but what they all have in common is that they concern a
kind of loop or cycle linking real-world objects and properties
with systematically changing patterns of sensory stimulation.
These changing patterns of sensory stimulation may be caused
by the movements of the subject (this is the central case), as
when we use head and eye movements to scan a visual scene. Or
they may be caused by movements of the object itself, or be due
to other elements in the environmental frame (such as changes
in illumination or light source). In addition, some features of
these various kinds of changing pattern will be due to properties
of the objects themselves (for example, the self-similarity of
a straight horizontal line along its length, giving rise to an
unchanging pattern of retinal stimulation as the eye tracks
along the line (see O’Regan and Noë 2001, p. 942), while others
will be due to the idiosyncrasies of the human visual apparatus
(for instance, the same straight line projected onto the retina
distorts dramatically as the eye moves up and down, due to the
curvature of the eyeball (op. cit., p. 941)).
Usually, many kinds of sensorimotor dependence (some, as we
have just seen, much more truly sensorimotor than others) are in
play when we see an object. It is our implicit knowledge of these
sensorimotor dependencies that explains, according to the strong
sensorimotor model, both the contents and the character (visual,
tactile, auditory, etc.) of our perceptual experiences. This stress
on knowledge of (or expectations concerning) sensorimotor
dependencies is meant as an alternative to standard appeals to
qualia conceived as intrinsic, ‘sensational’ properties of experience.
Instead of appreciating such mysterious intrinsic qualities in
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experience, it is suggested, we enact (that is, by acting bring into
being) perceptual experience.1 In the case of shape and spatial
properties, for example:
[T]he enactive view denies that we represent spatial properties in
perception by correlating them with kinds of sensation. There is
no sensation of roundness or distance, whether tactile, visual or
otherwise. When we experience something as a cube in perception,
we do so because we recognize that its appearance varies (or
would vary) as a result of movement, that it exhibits a specific
sensorimotor profile. (Noë 2004, pp. 101–2)
Noë’s account, taken as a whole, has at least three apparent
virtues, some key aspects of which I shall be seeking (as far as
possible) to preserve.
First, andmost importantly, there is the emphasis on skills rather
than on qualia as traditionally conceived.2 Skill-based accounts
(see also Pettit 2003, Clark 2000, Matthen 2005, and of course
Dennett 1991) offer a powerful antidote to the venom of zombie
thought experiments.3 In particular, the strong sensorimotor
account would—if all worked out according to plan—ensure that
sameness ofworld-engaging sensorimotor skills anddiscriminatory
capacities implied sameness of perceptual experience. More
demonstrably, the emphasis on world-engaging loops and
knowledge of sensorimotor dependencies affords an elegant and
compelling account of a range of real-world phenomena involving
sensory substitution and neural re-wiring.
The classic example here is Tactile-Visual Sensory Substitution
(TVSS; see Bach-y-Rita and Kercel 2002 for a recent review).
Equally impressive, though perhaps less well known, is the
1. This general claim most strongly characterizes the work of O’Regan and Noë 2001
and Noë 2004. Historically, the view has roots that span science (especially ecological
psychology; see Gibson 1979) and several influential philosophical traditions (ranging
from Husserl 1907, Heidegger [1927] 1961 and Merleau-Ponty [1945] 1962, to Ryle
[1949] 1990, MacKay 1967, and on to the original enactive approach of Varela,
Thompson and Rosch 1991). It is also consistent with (but goes far beyond) the
project of understanding mind and cognition in ways that are heavily ‘action-
oriented’ (Clark 1997) and that stress the importance of body, action, and the canny
use of environmental structure (for example, Hurley 1998, Ballard et al. 1997,
Hutchins 1995, Churchland, Ramachandran and Sejnowski 1994, Thelen and Smith
1994)).
2. For an excellent (though itself sceptical) account of the traditional conception of
qualia, see Pettit 2003.
3. For Noë’s own take on such thought experiments, see, for example, Noë 2004,
p. 124.
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auditory-visual substitution system (discussed in some detail in
O’Regan and Noë 2001), known as The Voice (see Meijer
1992). In this system, visual inputs to a head-mounted camera
are systematically translated into audible patterns. Objects high
in the visual field yield high-pitch sounds, while low ones yield
low-pitch sounds. Lateral location is indicated by the balance of
stereo sound, brightness by loudness of sound, and so on.
Crucially, as you move the camera around, the sound changes,
and over time subjects begin to learn the signature patterns (the
sensorimotor dependencies) characteristic of different objects.
In the original versions, subjects learnt to distinguish plants
from statues, crosses from circles, and such like.
The overall effect, though powerful, fell short of creating a truly
visual experience. But the claim of sensorimotor dependency theory
isboldand clear: towhatever extent it is possible to recreate the same
body of sensorimotor dependencies using an alternative route, you
will recreate the full content and character of the original perceptual
experience. This explains, according to O’Regan and Noë, why
some of Bach-y-Rita’s subjects report, for example, feeling as
if they were seeing a looming ball when fitted with a TVSS
system. By stressing similarities and differences in the profile of
sensorimotor dependencies, Noë-style accounts neatly explain
both the sense inwhich such systems create quasi-visual experiences
and theways inwhich the experiences thus generated (currently) fall
short of those supported by the original routes. For example, there
is a clear sensorimotor signature for a looming object whose
invariant characteristics are as well captured by patterns of sound
or tactile stimulation as they are by the (more typical) patterns
of retinal stimulation. Very fine-grained colour information,
by contrast, is currently not well captured by these kinds of
substitution system. In each case, however, what is at issue is not
the presence or absence of mysterious, ineffable qualia, but simply
the presence or absence of distinctive loops linking real-world
objects and properties to changing patterns of sensory stimulation.
The same story explains, we are told, the remarkable results
concerning the rewiring of visual inputs to auditory cortex in
young ferrets (Sur et al. 1999). Here, ‘auditory’ cortical areas
become (thanks to the early re-wiring) involved in the kinds of
sensorimotor loop characteristic of vision, and appear to support
fully normal visual capacities in the modified ferret:
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Appropriately embedded in a ‘visual’ sensorimotor dynamic,
neural activity in ‘auditory’ cortex in young ferrets takes on
‘visual’ functions. (Noë 2004. p. 227)
In short, appeals to the shape of a space of signature
sensorimotor dependencies here replaces appeal either to the
intrinsic properties of sensations (qualia) or to their more hard-
nosed (but arguably equally unexplanatory) cousins, the putative
special properties of specific neural regions.
The sensorimotor account is thus meant to be successful in
cases ‘where neural accounts alone are explanatorily afloat’
(Noë 2004, p. 226). What does the work is simply ‘the way
neural systems subserve the activity of the embodied and
embedded animal’ (op. cit.). For Noë, then, experience is
not caused by and realized in the brain, although it depends
causally on the brain. Experience is realized in the active life of
the skilful animal. (Noë 2004, p. 226)
I shall argue that neural accounts need not be seen as quite so
‘explanatorily afloat’ even if we agree (as I think we should)
that certain bodies of skill provide the key to understanding
perceptual experience.
Second (in the list of possible virtues) is the sensorimotormodel’s
recognition of the importance, power and scope of what (in the
artificial neural network community) is known as prediction
learning. Prediction learning is an ecologically plausible form of
supervised learning. In supervised learning, an agent is provided
with detailed feedback concerning the desired output for a given
input. Since such training seems to require a well-informed,
continually present teacher, its ecological plausibility, for most
real-world learning situations, looks doubtful. In some cases,
however, the world itself provides, at the very next time-step,
precisely the training information we need. Such is the case if, for
example, the task (typically, as presented to a Simple Recurrent
Neural Net; see, for example, Elman 1995) is to predict the next
sensory input itself, whether it be the next word in a sentence or
the next ‘frame’ in an evolving visual scene. Such prediction, for
a mobile embodied agent, often requires a double input, namely
information concerning the current sensory state and information
(for instance, in the form of efferent copy) concerning any
motion command currently in play. Given these items of
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information, a prediction can be made concerning the likely next
sensory state. Such a prediction, in the visual case, will thus need
to take into account both features of the scene and any motions
of the agent, and can immediately be tested against the actual
sensory stimulations duly delivered by the world.
Prediction learning has shown itself to be a valuable tool for
the extraction of a number of important regularities, such as
those characteristic of grammatical sentences, of shape, and of
object-permanence. In a sense, Noë and his collaborators are
extending this proven paradigm to attempt to account for the
full spectrum of perceptual experience, whose contents and
character are said to be sensitively dependent upon acquired
expectations (implicit knowledge) concerning the ways sensory
stimulation will morph and evolve with movement and other
kinds of input-altering change. This is, it seems to me, precisely
the kind of knowledge that would be embodied in the weights
and connections of a neural network trained using a prediction
learning regime.
Prediction learning is computationally potent, demonstrably
possible, and almost certainly biologically actual. The standard
models are, however (as we just saw), resolutely sub-personal,
with the predictions defined over sensory patterns that obtain
outwith any conscious awareness. On Noë’s account, however,
a critically important sub-class of cases are defined over
consciously experienced perspectival properties (‘P-properties’;
see Noë 2004, p. 83) of objects. These are depicted as objective
but relational properties: properties belonging to a perceiver-
object pair situated in some larger environment:
That a plate has a given P-shape is a fact about the plate’s shape,
one determined by the plate’s relation to the location of a
perceiver, and to the ambient light. (Noë 2004, p. 83)
Importantly, P-properties are also depicted as ‘looks of things,
their visual appearances’ (op. cit., p. 84), and thus as able to
participate in phenomenologically salient bouts of prediction
learning. Thus:
To see a circular plate from an angle, for example, is to see
something with an elliptical P-shape, and it is to understand
how that perspectival shape would vary as a function of one’s
(possible or actual) movements . . . (Noë 2004, p. 84)
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But whilst agreeing that prediction learning is a powerful
knowledge-extraction tool, especially in the perceptual arena, I
am not convinced that mature perceptual experience is then
constituted by4 the running of (what might be thought of as) the
prediction software itself. That is to say, I am not convinced that
appeal to predictions (or expectations) concerning the next sensory
stimulation directly and exhaustively explains (sub-personally) or
even characterizes (personally) perceptual experience.
We shall return to these issues in subsequent sections. For the
moment, it is useful simply to distinguish three different questions
that may be asked:
(1) What kinds of unconscious know-how drive or power
our fluid sensorimotor engagements with the world?
(2) What do we implicitly know about how our conscious
perceptual experience will vary during with movement
or change?
(3) What determines the content and character of our
conscious perceptual experience itself ?
These questions are all different, but the strong sensorimotor
model tends to offer the same kind of answer (one that invokes
implicit knowledge of sensorimotor dependencies) to them all. I
shall argue, however, that while the appeal to knowledge of
sensorimotor dependencies might well be crucial to answering the
first (as when an agent deploys ‘emulator circuitry’ to anticipate
sensory input and hence drive smooth reaching, etc.5), it is by no
means obvious what role it should play in the other two. Probably
we do (regarding question (2)) have expectations concerning the
ways conscious experience will alter as we move etc., but it is not
obvious that these expectations are crucial to the experience
itself. Indeed (and moving on to question (3)) there is considerable
evidence that perceptual experience is linked to specific forms of
neural processing that are systematically insensitive to much of
the fine detail of the sensorimotor loops themselves, thus casting
doubt on the strong sensorimotor response to both these questions.
4. Noë uses ‘constituted by’ to mean something like ‘realized by’, and that is the sense
intended here.
5. For one worked-out account of this, see Clark and Grush 1999.
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The third and final virtue I want (very briefly) to mention is
rather general, but both important and surprisingly delicate. It
is that the sensorimotor model is well poised to accommodate
narcissistic experience in an objective world. Talk of cognitive
agents that, by their own activity, ‘bring forth their worlds’ can
seem mysterious, if not mystical (see Clark and Mandik 2002
for some discussion). But, by linking the contents and character
of perceptual experience rather directly to acquired expectations
concerning patterns of sensorimotor dependence, the enactive
framework is able to do justice both to the notion of an objective,
mind-independent reality and to the sense in which the world as
perceived is the world of a specific type of embodied agent.
Such a (perceived) world is characterized by a suite of distinctive
sensorimotor dependencies, whose nature sensitively determines
the way the world is experienced through the senses.
According to this account, differently embodied beings will not
be able to directly experience our perceptual world, not because
it is populated by its own mysterious qualia but because they
lack the requisite ‘sensorimotor tuning’ (Noë 2004, p. 156). It is a
virtue of the sensorimotor model that it allows us to address this
thorny topic in a straightforward manner. But it is a vice (or so I
shall later suggest) that in doing so it implies that differently
embodied beings necessarily inhabit different ‘perceptual worlds’.
In general, then, I shall argue that in several domains the strong
sensorimotor model takes us one step too far. By stressing skills,
abilities and expectations, such accounts begin to offer a genuine
alternative to traditional qualia-based approaches to perception
and perceptual experience. But by focusing so much attention
upon the sensorimotor frontier, they deprive us of the resources
needed to construct a more nuanced and multi-layered model of
perceptual experience, and risk obscuring some of the true
complexity of our own cognitive condition.
II
Sensorimotor (Hyper) Sensitivity. Strong sensorimotor models
suffer, it seems to me, from a form of sensorimotor hypersensi-
tivity. Such models, or so I shall argue, are hypersensitive to the
very fine details of bodily form and dynamics and, as a result,
are prematurely committed on a variety of prima facie open
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(empirical) questions concerning the tightness of the relation
between perceptual experience and embodied action.
To begin to bring this rather general concern into focus,
consider first the matter of what Clark and Toribio (2001) dub
‘sensorimotor chauvinism’. A sensorimotor chauvinist, as we
use the term, is someone who holds, without compelling reason,
that absolute sameness of perceptual experience requires absolute
sameness of fine-grained sensorimotor profile. Noë (2004) is clear
enough about this commitment. For example, in a discussion
of the extent to which TVSS systems support ‘similarity of
experience’ (to normal vision) Noë asserts that:
Tactile vision is vision-like to the extent that there exists a
sensorimotor isomorphism between vision and tactile vision. But
tactile vision is unlike vision precisely to the extent that this
sensorimotor isomorphism fails to obtain. It will fail to obtain, in
general, whenever the two candidate realizing systems differ . . .
in their ability to subserve patterns of sensorimotor dependence.
(Noë 2004, p. 27)
Expanding on this idea, Noë adds that:
Only a vibrator array with something like the functional
multiplicity of the retina could support genuine (full-fledged,
normal) vision. To make tactile vision more fully visual, then, we
need to make the physical system on which it depends more like
the human visual system. (Noë op. cit., pp. 27–8)
Despite the superficially liberal appeal, in these quotes, to
‘functional multiplicity’, the required identity (for precise same-
ness of experience) actually reaches far down into the structure
of the physical apparatus itself, and demands very fine-grained
similarities of body and gross sensory equipment. O’Regan and
Noë are more explicit:
For two systems to have the same knowledge of sensorimotor
contingencies all the way down they will have to have bodies that
are identical all the way down (at least in relevant respects). For
only bodies that are alike in low-level detail can be functionally
alike in the relevant ways. (O’Regan and Noë 2001, p. 1015)
While later on in Noë’s single-author treatment he asserts that:
Creatures with bodies like ours would have systems that are visual
in the way ours are. Indeed, only such systems can participate in the
identical range of sensorimotor interactions that we participate in.
(Noë 2004, p. 159, my italics)
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The position is thus that while some coarse-grained isomorphisms
may be sufficient to begin to render the experience of a differently
embodied being visual, the full glory of normal human visual
experience depends upon a gross sensorimotor profile that very
sensitively tracks the fine details of human embodiment (including,
we saw, such matters as the precise curve of the eyeball).6 Of
course, even such a strong view need not be (as Noë (2004,
p. 28) rightly points out) chauvinistic if the requirement of full
sensorimotor isomorphism (for identity of experience) flows
from a compelling theoretical model.
But does it? The claim in question (let’s call it the claim of
Fine-Grained Sensorimotor Dependence) is that every difference
in fine-grained patterns of sensorimotor dependence will
potentially impact any associated perceptual experience. Notice
that this consequence does not in any way follow from the fact
(if it is a fact) that prediction learning plays a key role in
the acquisition of certain kinds of perceptual knowledge and
understanding. For the upshot of such learning might well be
forms of understanding that are systematically insensitive to
some changes in sensory stimulation, while exaggerating others.
Notice also that the patterns of sensorimotor dependence in
question cannot themselves be patterns in experiential space (in
the space of appearances) on pain of triviality. For of course,
every difference in experience implies some difference in experience.
But if we step outside the phenomenological arena, then the claim
(of Fine-Grained Sensorimotor Dependence) looks to involve the
premature settling of what should be an open empirical question.
Thus suppose, to imagine a concrete case, that certain patterns of
sensorimotor dependence concern the relations betweenmovement
and retinal stimulation. And suppose that some very small
difference in embodiment makes a very small difference to such
patterns. It is surely an open empirical question whether every
difference in respect of such stimulation makes a difference to the
content and character of any conscious perceptual experience
6. Thus we read that ‘. . . it turns out that there is good reason to believe that the
sensorimotor dependencies are themselves determined by low-level details of the
physical systems on which our sensory systems depend. The eye and the visual parts
of the brain form a most subtle instrument indeed, and thanks to this instrument,
sensory stimulation varies in response to movement in precise ways. To see as we
do, you must have a sensory organ and a body like ours’ (Noë 2004, p. 112).
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that ensues. And the same will be true wherever in the processing
story we choose to focus, even if we opt for patterns of cortical
rather than retinal stimulation.
Systematic insensitivities might, in fact, serve some functional
purpose. It is easy to imaginedesign and engineering considerations
that would favour various kinds of buffering, filtering, and re-
coding of perceptual inputs such that the contents and character
of conscious perceptual experience might be determined at some
considerable remove from the fine-grained details of sensorimotor
loops. As we shall later see, there is some reason to believe that
human perceptual experience is indeed determined at just such a
remove, and that it involves tweaked andoptimized representations
that do not march sensitively in step with the flow of gross sensory
stimulation.
It might be objected that the kind of hypersensitivity I am
contesting is simply the price one pays for appealing to embodied
skills as an alternative to traditional appeals to qualia. But this is
not so. For the skills to which such deflationary accounts (among
which I count the strong sensorimotor theory) appeal may
themselves be coarse- or fine-grained, and may thus involve
activities and capacities that are systematically insensitive to
some of the goings-on at the sensorimotor frontier. For example,
they may focus on what Matthen (2005) (and see also Pettit 2003)
calls ‘epistemic’ skills: skills of sifting, sorting, classifying,
selecting, choosing, re-identifying and comparing. These skills
(which must, in any deflationary context, be said to constitute,
rather than to call upon, perceptual experience) may depend on
modes of processing and forms of internal representation that
ultimately float free of the full spectrum of fine sensorimotor
detail. Nor, finally, need the appeal to skills (rather than qualia)
force us to abandon the notion of a distinctive personal level at
which a cognitive agent has access to (some) information. That
is to say, it should not force us to abandon the notion of that
which is in some important sense manifest (see Pettit 2003) to
the agent concerned.
I suspect that in his (admirable) eagerness to avoid the qualia
trap, Noë has been led to define appearances rather too directly
in terms of objective relations between objects and perceivers,
with the result that whatever impacts this objective relation
(more precisely, whatever impacts the way this relation unfolds
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during sensorimotor activity) is said to impact (if only very subtly)
how things look to the agent. Other ways of unpacking a skill-
based account need not, as we’ll see, buy into this kind of picture.
But before exploring such a possibility, it helps to introduce a
missing layer of complexity in (at least some versions of ) the
strong sensorimotor model itself.
III
What Reaching Teaches. The complexity in question concerns the
role of reason and planning in (what might be thought of as) the
architecture of perceptual experience. According to O’Regan and
Noë we are conscious of a specific visually presented state of affairs
only when our practical knowledge about the ways movement will
yield sensory change is actively invoked in the service of reason,
planning and judgement. In such cases we do not merely exercise
our mastery of sensorimotor contingencies, for we do this
even when we are unaware of our own actions, as when
returning a fast tennis serve or absent-mindedly driving along a
familiar road. Rather, conscious awareness enters the scene when
we make use of that very same knowledge of sensorimotor
contingencies ‘for the purposes of thought and planning’ (O’Regan
and Noë 2001, p. 944). On this account to consciously see is
to explore one’s environment in a way that is mediated by one’s
mastery of sensorimotor contingencies, and to be making use of
this mastery in one’s planning, reasoning and speech behavior.
(O’Regan and Noë op. cit., p. 944)
The point of adding such a requirement is clear. Very often,when
we exercise our implicit knowledge of patterns of sensorimotor
dependence, no corresponding perceptual awareness ensues. To
explain the difference, O’Regan and Noë invoke use in reason,
planning and speech behaviour as a kind of spotlight that
allows some (but not all) of our active knowledge of sensorimotor
contingencies to condition perceptual awareness.7
7. Interestingly, this requirement (which is made much of by O’Regan and Noë) is
nowhere in evidence in Noë’s 2004 solo treatment. What we find there is just the
bare idea of the active use of specific bodies of knowledge concerning sensorimotor
dependencies in the guidance of behaviour. Noë (personal communication) picks
this issue out as one where his views are in a state of flux. The guiding thought, he
writes, is that ‘being conscious of a feature is actively probing it—it’s reaching out
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There is, however, another possibility hereabouts, one that has
significant empirical support and that is ultimately (or so I shall
argue) at odds with the strong sensorimotor model. This is the
possibility (Milner and Goodale 1995, Clark 2001, Jacob and
Jeannerod 2003) that the contents of conscious perceptual
experience are determined by the activation of a distinctive body
of internal representations operating quasi-autonomously from
the realm of direct sensorimotor engagement. Such representations
are perceptual but are geared towards (and optimized for) the
specific needs of reasoning and planning rather than those of
fluent physical engagement. These representations are conditioned
by a stream of inputs that do indeed originate at the sensors, but
this stream proceeds in large part in parallel to the processing
stream dedicated to the fluid control of online, fine-tuned,
sensorimotor engagement, and is systematically insensitive to
much of the lower-level detail.
These ‘dual-stream’ models appear to differ from strong
sensorimotor models in at least two crucial respects. First, they
depict visual experience as depending on a suite of representations
optimized for reasoning and planning, whereas strong sensori-
motor models depict visual experience as occurring when
(possibly very fine-grained) sensorimotor knowledge is either
simply active, or more plausibly when it is put into contact with,
or used for the purposes of, reasoning and planning. Second,
these models looks to be fully compatible with the idea (rejected
outright by the strong sensorimotor model) that conscious
visual experience might often (and perhaps always) depend on
specific local aspects of internal representational activity rather
than on whole-animal sensorimotor loops.
A major part of the empirical impetus for the dual-stream
story comes from Milner and Goodale, who suggest (1995) that
conscious visual awareness reflects information-processing activity
in a specific visual processing stream geared towards enduring
object properties, explicit recognition, and semantic recall. This
andmaking contact with it, as it were’. But such active probing surely characterizes the
intelligent saccades of the driver’s eyes even when the driver is attending to other
matters and not consciously experiencing the details of the road. Alternatively, if
active probing means something like ‘probing in the context of attentive problem-
solving’, then we are back to the full-strength role for reason and planning assigned
by O’Regan and Noë.
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stream—the ventral stream—is also in charge whenever real-world
objects are unavailable, and governs our attempts to mime actions
on imagined or recalled objects. Actual object-based motor
engagements, by contrast, are depicted as the province of a semi-
autonomous processing stream—the dorsal stream—that guides
fluent motor action in the here and now. Milner and Goodale
thus contrast capacities of visually-guided action and capacities
of conscious visual perception, suggesting that these come apart
in a variety of unexpected and revealing ways.
In support of this hypothesis, Milner and Goodale invoke a rich
body of data concerning patients with damage to areas in either the
dorsal or ventral streams. The best knownof these is the patientDF
who suffers fromventral stream lesions and cannot visually identify
objects or visually discriminate shapes. Nonetheless, she is able
to pick up these very same objects—that she cannot visually
identify—using fluent, well-oriented precision grips. Others, by
contrast, suffer dorsal stream lesions and
have little trouble seeing [i.e., identifying objects in a visual scene]
but a lot of trouble reaching for objects they can see. It is as
though they cannot use the spatial information inherent in any
visual scene. (Gazzaniga 1998, p. 109)
Milner and Goodale also cite performance data from normal
human subjects using experimental paradigms such as Aglioti
et al.’s ingenious use of the Tichener Circles illusion. In the
standard illusion, subjects misjudge the relative size of two circles
each surrounded by a ring of larger or smaller circles. Aglioti et al.
(1995) set up a physical version of the illusion using thin poker
chips as the discs, and then asked subjects to ‘pick up the target
disc on the left if the two discs appeared equal in size and to
pick up the one on the right if they appeared different in size’
(Milner and Goodale 1995, p. 167). The surprising upshot was
that even when subjects were unaware of—but clearly subject
to—the illusion, their motor control systems produced a precisely
fitted grip with a finger-thumb aperture perfectly suited to the
actual (non-illusory) size of the disc. This aperture was not arrived
at by touching and adjusting, but was instead the direct result of
the visual input. Yet—to repeat—it reflected not the illusory disc
size given in the subject’s visual experience, but the actual size. In
short:
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Grip size was determined entirely by the true size of the target disc
[and] the very act by means of which subjects indicated their
susceptibility to the visual illusion (that is, picking up one of
two target circles) was itself uninfluenced by the illusion.
(Milner and Goodale 1995, p. 168)
This was, indeed, a somewhat startling result, again suggesting8
that the processing underlying visual awareness may be operating
quite independently of that underlying the visual control of
action.
Finally, Milner and Goodale invoke a number of computational
conjectures concerning the inability of a single encoding to
efficiently support both visual form recognition and visuomotor
action. I shall not further rehearse these bodies of evidence here
(see Clark 1999, 2001, Jacob and Jeannerod 2003). Notice,
however, that it seems very likely that prediction learning will
play a big role in the development and exercise of the kinds of
skill that best characterize the (putatively non-conscious) dorsal
stream. For smooth visuomotor action (such as reaching and
grasping without jagged movements or unwanted oscillations)
looks to require the ability to predict the next sensory input in
advance of its actual (too late) arrival at the sensory peripheries,
and this kind of prediction (see Clark and Grush 1999) certainly
requires implicit knowledge of sensorimotor dependencies.
At this point it will be useful to locate the dual visual systems
hypothesis in a wider framework. This framework depicts
conscious visual perception as making available—at the personal
level—forms of encoding and representation optimized for (or
simply specialized for) their role in reasoning, choice and
action-selection rather than for their role in actual sensorimotor
engagement. Thus in the Titchener Circles experiment, the
conscious visual representations would be specialized ( just as
Milner and Goodale suggest) to guide the choice of which disc
to pick up, and the choice of what kind of grip to deploy (one
apt for picking up and not for, say, throwing). The conscious
illusion (of one circle’s being larger than another) may then be
best explained by the visual system’s delivering a representation
8. There has been much discussion, pro and con, of this example in the recent
literature. For a good overview (whose conclusion is that a weakened form of
dual-stream model is probably correct) see Jacob and Jeannerod 2003. For further
discussion of these complexities, see Clark 2001.
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enhanced in the light of information about relative size, a trick
that is effective for reasoning and choice in most ecologically
realistic situations, but that would be damaging (resulting in a
mass of failed or botched encounters) were it replicated by fine
sensorimotor control systems.
This general model of the functional role of conscious awareness
is found in (among others) the work of Koch (2004) who speaks of
‘summaries’ apt to aid frontal regions in the selection of one among
a set of possible types of action or response. It is also suggested by
Campbell’s (2002) ‘targets’ view of consciousness, and (in the
treatment closest to the present account) in Jacob and Jeannerod’s
(2003) delicately nuanced version of the dual visual streams view.9
Common to all these views is the image of conscious perceptual
experience as reflecting the content of representations whose
special cognitive role is to enable the deliberate selection of targets
for action and of types of action, and to support a range of
‘epistemic skills’ such as sorting, sifting, comparing and the like
(see Pettit 2003, Matthen 2005). Representations optimized for
such purposes need not, and typically do not, reflect the full
intricacies of our actual ongoing sensorimotor engagements
with the world. Instead, they are geared, tweaked and nuanced
so as to inform reason, selection, comparison and choice. They
thus reflect only the very broad outlines of a space of possible
targets and possible kinds of sensorimotor engagement. And
though they must be sensitive to sensory input, they need not
(indeed, must not) be sensitive to every nuance in the ongoing
mass of sensory stimulation. The representations that ultimately
determine visual experience are quite distinct, this alternative
account insists, from those that support the sensorimotor loops
by means of which we successfully engage the very world we
perceive. They are, nonetheless, still distinctively visual, in so
far as they represent the special kinds of information gathered
(in normal agents) by (part of ) the visual pathway: features
such as rough spatial location, colour, shape, and so on. TVSS
systems, on this account, aim to make the same kinds of
information available by means of superficially different sets of
signals, and will succeed to whatever extent this turns out to be
9. It also seems implicit inMatthen’s (2005) account of the class of ‘descriptive sensory
systems’.
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possible (which will in turn depend both on the nature and extent
of neural plasticity and on the ability, of these alternate input
devices, to make the same bodies of information available, and
at roughly the same time-scale: for this take on TVSS, see Bach
y Rita and Kercel 2003).
Noë (2004, p. 19) claims that these dual visual systems ideas are
‘at best orthogonal to the basic claims of the enactive approach’.
The reason given (see also op. cit., p. 11) is that the enactive
approach makes no claims about what conscious visual
perception is for, and hence remains neutral on the topic of
vision-for-action versus vision-for-conscious-perception. More
positively, O’Regan and Noë (2001, p. 969) claim that, with a
few provisos, there is actually a good fit between the strong
sensorimotor model and the dual visual systems ideas, since
the requirement (for conscious experience) that sensorimotor
knowledge be active in the service of reason and planning predicts
the kinds of dissociation found in the literature.
I think it should be clear, however, that such direct attempts at
reconciliation cannot succeed. For what is at issue is not simply
the evidence of (substantial) dissociation but the best functional
and architectural explanation of that evidence. And the best
functional and architectural explanation, according to Milner,
Goodale and others, is that conscious perceptual experience
reflects the activation of representations that have less to do
with the fine details of world-engaging sensorimotor loops, and
more to do with the need to assign inputs to categories, types,
and relative locations, so as better to sift, sort, select, identify,
compare, recall, imagine and reason.
The contrast between the two views emerges in, for example,
O’Regan and Noë’s surprising description of DF as a case of
‘partial awareness’ in which ‘she is unable to describe what she
sees but is otherwise able to use it for the purpose of guiding
action’ (op. cit., p. 969). DF, recall, is able to use visually
presented information for some purposes, for example, to post
a letter into a slot, even though she claims not to visually
experience the shape, colour or orientation of the slot. O’Regan
and Noë depict this as a case of ‘partial awareness’, since visual
information is still playing an action-guiding role in the overall
organism–environment loop. But this surely conflates visual
awareness with the use of visual information, precisely the knot
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that Milner and Goodale were trying to untie. For this reason
Goodale (2001) rejects O’Regan and Noë’s account of DF,
pointing out that she ‘shows almost perfect visuomotor control
in the absence of any evidence that she actually ‘‘sees’’ the form
of the object she is grasping’.
Here, I suspect, the enactive framework is trying to wag the
empirical dog. For the enactive framework is, as we saw,
pre-committed to linking the perceptual facts to facts about
whole animal embedded, embodied activity. Perception, including
conscious perception, is thus said to be ‘a kind of skilful activity on
the part of the animal as a whole’ (Noe 2004, p. 2; and see Varela,
Thompson and Rosch 1991).10 But this pre-commitment works
against taking truly seriously the evidence for deep dissociations
between vision-for-action and vision-for-perception.
In contrast with this ‘whole animal’ view, dual stream models
are open to the possibility that specific perceptual capacities
and experiences depend upon (and can be brought about by)
the activity of specific aspects of neural circuitry. In the case of
conscious visual experience, such models embrace the idea that
processing in the ventral stream plays a special role in the
construction of conscious experience, and that there is serious
functional decomposition (coupled with dense online integration;
see Jacob and Jeannerod 2003) between systems for conscious
experience and systems for fluent, fine-tuned visuomotor action.
Such models retain the important emphasis on skills rather
than qualia. But they do so while recognizing the very large
extent to which the human agent is a fragmented bag of embodied
skills, only some of which are potentially relevant to the contents
and character of perceptual experience. In particular, these will be
skills geared rather directly towards reasoning and planning, such
as abilities of sifting, sorting, classifying, selecting, choosing, re-
identifying, imagining, recalling and comparing. This special
focus opens up a significant buffer zone between the fine details
of movement and of motion-dependent sensory input and the
rather more specialized skill base that determines the contents
10. As an aside, this same broad commitment, to the constitutive role of whole
organism activity, probably leads to other oddities, such as Noë’s later suggestion
that a concert pianist, in losing his arms, would thereby (instantly, as what appears
to be a matter of conceptual necessity) lose his know-how since ‘the knowledge was,
precisely, arm-dependent’ (Noë 2004, p. 121).
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and character of perceptual experience. What counts (for
perceptual experience) is then this suite of epistemic skills,
however they happen to be supported by cycles of low-level sensor-
imotor pick-up. And there is, as far as I can see, no compelling
reason to believe that these kinds of epistemic skills need to
march in tight lockstep with a being’s full sensorimotor profile.
Indeed, they may depend on representational forms that are
deliberately (that is to say, productively) insensitive to many
fine details of bodily orientation and sensory stimulation. If this
is correct, then the perceptual experience of differently embodied
animals could in principle be identical (not merely similar) to our
own.
I’d like to end by addressing (however inadequately) what is
perhaps the very largest issue hereabouts, namely the role of
actual world-engaging loops in the construction of perceptual
experience. For it is here that the greatest care is needed if we
are to preserve what is most important in the sensorimotor
account. Thus consider, to take one final example, the claim
(Noë 2004, p. 67) that ‘experiential content is itself virtual’. The
idea here, in keeping with the general emphasis on sensorimotor
contact with the world, is that experience presents all the detail
in a visual scene as present, but virtually so, rather like ‘the way
that a web site’s content is present on your desktop’ (op. cit.,
p. 50). In the latter case, it can seem just as if, to use Noë’s own
example, you have the entire contents of the online version of
the New York Times encoded on your hard drive. But of course,
this is not so. Rather, information is accessed from the distant
site on a kind of just-in-time, need-to-know basis. Similarly,
according to Noë, we perceptually experience the visual scene as
rich in detail. But this experience, while not illusory ( pace the
Grand Illusion idea popularized by Dennett and others: see
Noë 2004, pp. 50–67) is rooted not in the presence of a rich
neurally encoded representation of all that detail, but in our
skill-based access to the requisite detail as and when needed:
The detail is present—the perceptual world is present—in the
sense that we have a special kind of access to the detail, an
access controlled by patterns of sensorimotor dependence with
which we are familiar. (Noë 2004, p. 67)
This stress on access is correct and, I think, profoundly important.
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But what exactly is the role of the actual sensorimotor loops by
means of which such access is provided? How, that is to say,
should we conceive the role of the specific routines by means of
whichwe thus engage theworld, retrievingmore visual information
as and when needed?
One radical possibility is that these specific sensorimotor loops
are now part of the supervenience base for the present experience
of richness. Another, only slightly less radical, possibility is that
our implicit knowledge of these specific sensorimotor loops is
part of the supervenience base for the present experience of
richness. But still another possibility is that the present experience
of richness is simply a present experience of the easy accessibility
(of certain kinds of information) as andwhen needed, and that the
specific world-engaging loops provide merely the contingent
means to this end. The supervenience base for the perceptual
experience of richness, on this model, would not include the
routines that actually retrieve such information. Indeed, the
very same experience of perceptual richness looks compatible
with the running (behind the scenes, as it were) of a wide variety
of quite different retrieval routines.
The deepest question raised by the strong sensorimotor model,
is surely this: to what extent does the ‘how’ of information pick-up
(the specific details of some sensorimotor retrieval routine) matter
for perceptual experience itself ? My own suspicion, which I have
tried to make plausible in the present treatment, is that such
details may be merely the contingent means by which a certain
higher-level, overarching functional organization is achieved.
The kind of functional story required will vary from case to
case, but will typically be pitched at some remove from the full
details of our active sensorimotor repertoire.
IV
The Heideggerian Theatre. In sum, none of the considerations
adduced by the strong sensorimotor theorist seem to support
the radical conclusion that qualitative experience is ‘not caused
by and realized in the brain’ (Noë 2004, p. 226). What does
seem to be true is that intentionally-driven cycles of world-
engaging organism–environment activity are the typical means
by which neural circuitry becomes recruited so as to be poised
62 ANDY CLARK AND NAOMI EILAN
to control certain key kinds of action. It is this achieved poise,
rather than anything more specific to the neural circuitry itself,
that then does the real explanatory work. Thus the fans of skill-
based approaches (and I count myself among them) believe
that the right kinds of action-enabling poise (of, I want to say,
some active inner state) quite literally constitute the presence of
perceptual experience of various kinds. The considerations
concerning ventral stream processing suggest, however, that the
relevant kinds of action-enabling poise11 are not tied to the fine
detail of specific bodily equipment or motions. Instead, what
matters is poise is for the control of a special class of more
epistemically pregnant actions, such as those (highlighted by
Dennett, Matthen and Pettit) of sifting, sorting, comparing and
discriminating.
Suppose we then push the question: what is it about the active
neural patterns that makes them yield or support the very
experiences that they do? The best answer, just as the skill-
based story insisted, looks to be: because they are such as to
enable the kinds of activities they do. If that is so, there may
simply be no answer to the bald (hard) question, ‘Why does this
pattern of neural pattern yield this experience?’ Rather, the
neural pattern, in bodily and worldly context, is such as to
support a signature set of epistemic abilities, and it is these
alone that explain (by constituting) the phenomenal content.
The correct conclusion is that neural activity alone indeed suffices,
as far as we can currently tell, to support any given perceptual
experience, but that no explanation of the link between the
neural activity and the experience can afford to ignore the shape
of the space of enabled actions (of that special epistemic class)
on pain of eventually identifying an unexplanatory disjunction
instead of an explanatorily pregnant correlation.12
Strong sensorimotor models of perceptual experience do us a
service by foregrounding embodied skills and eschewing appeals
11. It remains possible that more neglected elements of experience, ones other than
those concerning the typical qualia suspects such as shape, colour, texture, and so
on, may depend more directly on dorsal stream activity. Thus Matthen (2005,
p. 301) argues that the ‘feeling of presence’ may depend on dorsal stream activity
even if the other more descriptive elements do not.
12. For an argument of this kind, but without the stress on a special class of epistemic
actions, see Hurley forthcoming.
SENSORIMOTOR SKILLS AND PERCEPTION 63
to qualia as traditionally conceived. But they fail to do justice to
the many firewalls, fragmentations and divisions of cognitive
labour that characterize our engagements with the world our
senses reveal. Strong sensorimotor models, despite (or perhaps
because of ) their emphasis on whole animal world-engaging
activity, paper over this complex motley by casting everything
prematurely in the single currency of known patterns of fine
sensorimotor dependence. By trying to distil all that matters
about human perceptual experience from the homogeneous mash
of expectations concerning sensorimotor dependencies, such
models are congenitally blind to the computationally potent
insensitivity of key information-processing events to the full subtle-
ties of embodied cycles of sensing and moving. In place of this
common sensorimotor currency we need to consider a more
complex picture that displays a cognitive economy replete with
special-purpose streamings and with multiple, quasi-independent
forms of internal (and external) representation and processing.
To embrace such complexity is not to downplay the role of the
body, but to reveal it aright. The body matters because it is
the common locus ofmany (though by nomeans all) of these diverse
epistemic currents and influences, and because it is their common,
and often conflicted, object of proximal control. The body is (dare I
say it?) the Heideggerian Theatre: the one place where it all comes
together, or as together as it comes at all.
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